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Introduction
For the last 20 years, the established wisdom among most environmental economists and policymakers is that a cap-and-trade system is the most desirable approach to controlling emissions because it is cost-effective. But in their recent paper, -Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right‖ (henceforth, EPR), Muller and Mendelsohn describe a broader, more appealing concept of efficiency that incorporates information on damages caused by emissions from specific sources: -The science and economics related to pollution control,‖ they write,
-have advanced to the point where regulations can now move from cost-effectiveness to efficiency‖ (Muller and Mendelsohn 2009, 1735) . They recommend a regulatory program that would equate marginal abatement costs with marginal damages-expressed as dollars per ton of pollutant emitted--for each source.
This recommendation constitutes a large departure from existing policy, going well beyond the modest regional refinements to ton-for-ton trading approaches that the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) already considered and rejected (U. S. EPA 1998a S. EPA ,1998b . It also departs from recommendations by other researchers to differentiate tons by region (e.g., Banzhaf et al. 2004) . As a result, it merits scrutiny and discussion.
We argue that despite the appeal of the EPR solution, its conclusion that source-specific marginal damage estimates are ready for use in regulations is simply incompatible with the empirical evidence presented in EPR. In particular, we explore the implications of the EPR finding of negative marginal damages for many heavily populated counties. The associated nonconvexities, we show, imply that the source-specific trading ratios that EPR advocates lead to unattractive outcomes not likely to be efficient. We also show how the EPR assumption that the regulators know damages with certainty oversimplifies key aspects of efficient air pollution regulation. These estimates of negative marginal damages in urban areas indicate nonconvexities because marginal damages are presumably positive at some lower level of emissions. The economics literature has recognized issues raised by nonconvexities in the context of pollution for decades (Baumol and Bradford 1972) . In an evaluation of pollution control focused on ozone, Repetto (1987, 14) states that in the presence of a nonconvexity, an -all-or-nothing choice is (32)).
Use of source-specific trading ratios, can ensure that trades do not increase damages, provided that is set equal to 2)
, which can be derived by totally differentiating a general damage function , with damages and other emissions held constant. Competition in the market for permits serves to equalize the marginal cost of avoiding damages among all sources. But if marginal damages are negative for some source i, then use of source-specific trading ratios would mean source i could sell permits (while increasing emissions) to another source with positive marginal damages that also would increase its emissions. Trades where both sources increase their emissions do not represent a stable outcome because sources with negative estimated damages would generally supply permits at lower cost than other sources. 4 Put differently, the use of source-specific trading ratios in the presence of negative marginal damages for some sources could mean that 3 He also notes that a decentralized incentive system (such as Pigouvian taxes) may not result in an efficient allocation of resources. 4 EPR contains another proposal-source-specific taxes based on estimates of marginal damages-that does not work much better with negative marginal damage estimates. It would lead to subsidies for some sources to increase their emissions. Unless the cost of an emissions increase also rises as emissions increase, such subsidies could entail substantial costs to the public treasury. 5 Implausibly, the model used in EPR generates a quasi-checkerboard pattern of positive and negative damage estimates among some neighboring counties. 6 Since the sign of the marginal damage estimates is sensitive to small differences in air quality modeling, the full scope of the nonconvexity in damages is unclear without a better appraisal of how damage estimates change with alternative modeling approaches.
Uncertainty in even the sign of the marginal damage estimates undermines the claim in EPR that -regulations can now move from cost-effectiveness to efficiency‖ (p. 1735). Table 4 of EPR lists trading ratios between 1:1 and 10:1 for ground-level sources of sulfur dioxide and nearby power plants. The wide ranges of these trading ratios and adjacent counties' marginal damage estimates raise questions about whether specific trades would hurt the environment.
EPA, state, and local regulatory authorities historically have been risk averse and will be reluctant to approve or endorse trades between neighboring sources without an assurance of 5 A complete discussion of uncertainty also ought to include analysis of why the different models disagree on the direction (sign) of the effect for some pollutants in some specific places. 6 Within the metropolitan area of Atlanta, Georgia, one county with positive damage estimates (Fulton) separates two contiguous counties with negative damage estimates (Clayton and DeKalb) from a third with a negative damage estimate (Cobb). Finally, the uncertainty associated with the marginal damage estimates suggests that adopting source-specific trading ratios may invite rampant rent-seeking. Sources would seek a re-estimation to yield a lower damage estimate, and dueling experts would debate the relative merit of various methods. The rent-seeking costs could be quite large, since the EPR approach would require the regulator to estimate environmental damages with greater precision than for environmental regulations generally. Lengthy litigation would be likely.
Summary
Muller and Mendelsohn's vision-a genuinely efficient approach to emissions regulation-surely merits attention. While a well-established economics literature identifies likely efficiency gains from equating marginal abatement costs and marginal damages for each source, the nonconvexities and uncertainties in marginal damage estimates preclude a claim that the science and economics have advanced to the point where regulations can adopt sourcespecific damage estimates to enhance efficiency. Simply excluding the sources with negative damages from the source-specific trading program may seem like an attractive and minor refinement of the EPR proposal, but in fact it raises important new challenges. What should be the control policy regarding NO x emissions in the counties with negative damages? Should any emissions trading be allowed among these counties or between them and other sources? How much confidence should regulators have in marginal damage estimates before identifying some as positive and others as negative? Further analysis and review may later indicate that the EPR recommendation for source-specific trading could be gainfully applied to a specific subset of pollutants and sources-for example, only SO 2 emissions from electric generating units. Finally, although a comprehensive quantitative uncertainty analysis of the source-specific marginal damage estimates represents a significant technical challenge, regulatory authorities will need to consider the implications of these uncertainties before deciding whether to incorporate sourcespecific marginal damages into a regulatory program. 
